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Abstract 
 
In their final book Deleuze and Guattari state that the practice of philosophy ‘calls for a future form, for 
a new earth and people that do not yet exist’. This call is deeply problematic: aside from its aristocratic 
overtones, it is difficult to ascertain what it might sound like, how to give it voice, and what might come 
of it. But it is also problematic in form. In this paper I will explain how. After investigating its genesis in 
Deleuze’s engagements with Nietzsche and Bergson, I will outline the geography of the call as it appears 
in the mature work of Deleuze and Guattari. Aided by this analysis the paper will conclude by making 
some tentative remarks on what is to be done with the call for a new earth and people – or more 
accurately, what might be done with it, for the benefit of what is to come. 
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Introduction 
 
What are the major problems of today, the ones that demand our immediate and collective attention? 
We each have our own lists, but I would hazard to say that many of us would nominate one or both of 
the following: (1) the destruction of the natural environment; and (2) the polarisation of politics. 
Regarding the first problem, responses have commonly revolved around efforts to ‘save the earth’, to 
‘slow down’ the rate of change and ‘conserve’ what currently exists (or bring back what recently used to). 
By the same token, however, some scholars, for instance those working within the rubrics of 
environmental philosophy and anthropocene studies, have argued that if the earth is to be ‘saved’ then it 
might require that we think of it anew (McWhorter and Stenstad, 2009; Parr, 2017; Saldanha and Stark, 
2016). In this respect, the successful conservation of the earth might be dependent upon the creation of 
a new earth, a new way of conceiving and approaching the wholistic entity that we call ‘earth’. As for the 
second problem on my list, the predominance of governments espousing views that were once viewed 
as ‘extreme’ continues to accelerate across the globe. To give the latest example, at the time of writing 
Brazil has recently elected a far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, who speaks of the military dictatorship 
that ruled the country from 1964-85 in glowing terms. Developments such as these have been 
accompanied by a return of discourse that invokes ‘the people’. Whilst politicians have always attempted 
to claim the support of ‘the people’ in their public addresses, recent incantations by elected officials in a 
wide variety of locations have been disturbingly reminiscent of fascist language from the period 
Hobsbawm called the ‘age of extremes’. Such appeals to ‘the people’ often involve a heavy dose of 
romanticised nostalgia, illustrated perhaps most obviously by the British ‘Brexiteers’ that hark back to 
the former glories of the Empire. But just as relevant are those instances where ‘the people’ refers to a 
populous that is in the process of awakening or taking shape, a new people whose day is now dawning. 
 
These two problems, one concerning ‘the earth’ and the other ‘the people’, are most certainly distinct, 
but they are also related. Their connection is most evident, I would suggest, when considered in their 
futural and aspirational registers: a new earth, for instance, would seem to call for a new people that 
populates it; and in the other direction, one might surmise that it is only a new people that can bring 
forth a new earth. But what is the new earth and new people in these contexts, ontologically speaking, and 
what could they be? Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari can be of assistance in our consideration of these 
questions. Throughout their joint writings they repeatedly refer to the endeavour of engendering a new 
earth and a new people. What they mean by this, however, is not immediately clear. It is also varied, 
veering between the fields of political activism and psychoanalysis to the fine arts and the definition of 
philosophy. In this paper I will attempt to provide an overview of Deleuze and Guattari’s periodic 
discussions of a new earth and a new people. As those familiar with Deleuze and Guattari studies (and 
its influence) will confirm, passing references by commentators to this call for a new earth and a new 
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people are not uncommon; there have also been some important pieces of scholarship that examine the 
nature of the call in a particular context, such as political philosophy and the creative arts (which I will 
go on to explore). But given that each of these invocations by Deleuze and Guattari are rather oblique 
and brief, a schematic explication and overview of the relevant passages can complement the existing 
scholarship and improve the wider appreciation of their call, including what it means, or could, for our 
contemporary situation. 
 
Also of use towards this end would be a greater awareness of the genesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s call 
for a new earth and new people, as it appears in Deleuze’s earlier work. Such will comprise the second 
ambition of this paper: to trace the genealogy of the call back through Deleuze’s engagements with 
Nietzsche and Bergson. If this task is necessary, it is for establishing two key aspects of the call. Firstly, 
the new earth/people does not exist, and to a certain extent never will – it/they must exist as imperceptible, 
as a ‘minoritarian becoming’ in the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari. And secondly, great problems, 
such as the two on my list above, cannot be solved – they must instead be dissolved, which is to say 
constructed and fabulated. By intersecting these two threads from Nietzsche and Bergson, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s call for a new earth and a new people could be described as an untimely problem. In the next 
section of the paper I will explain in more detail what I mean by this. Subsequently, we will be better 
placed to map out in the following section the eclectic geography of Deleuze and Guattari’s call for a 
new earth and a new people. Finally, I will then broach the burning question ignited by the genealogy 
and analytical overview of the call: how might we use this thinking to not simply address the great 
problems of our day, but problematise today for tomorrow? 
 
 
The Call as an Untimely Problem 
 
In his Foreword to the essay ‘On the Utility and Liability of History for Life’, Nietzsche (1995: 86-87) 
closes by saying: ‘I have no idea what the significance of classical philology would be in our age, if not to 
have an unfashionable effect – that is, to work against the time and thereby have an effect upon it, 
hopefully for the benefit of a future time’. In what follows Nietzsche explains how history has come to 
exert a restrictive role in society. Over the course of the 19th century, the discipline of history in Germany 
underwent a process of scientification, whereby the past came to be viewed as objective data that could 
be ‘discovered’ by historians who implemented an adequately ‘rigorous’ scientific method. Nietzsche 
(1995: 116 and 138) mocks such technicians, accusing them of ‘congenital greyness’ and ‘weakened 
personality’. He refers to them as ‘“servants of truth” who possess neither the will nor the strength to 
judge, and who set themselves the task of pursuing “pure, ineffective” knowledge’ (1995: 123). It may be 
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that what they discover is factually true, but for Nietzsche it is ‘a truth that amounts to nothing’ (1995: 
123). 
 
At play here is the distinction between knowledge and life. According to Nietzsche, the historians of his 
day are slaves to knowledge. If asked they would no doubt say that the knowledge they produce is, for 
the most part, useful to life. But such an outcome is a secondary consideration; of primary concern is 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake. If the true knowledge they produce happens to harm life then this is 
not really their concern or responsibility. How might one act differently, though, if life was placed above 
knowledge? And what if history was put in the service of life, rather than knowledge? To facilitate this it 
is necessary to break the shackles of history, to get out from under its enormous weight. Nietzsche offers 
two complementary antidotes: on the one hand we need to learn how to forget, like a goldfish, and be 
without history – to be ahistorical (1995: 87, 163); and on the other hand we need to be above or beyond 
history, suprahistorical, we need to show some confidence in ourselves and act as legislators, creators of 
rules, beings who can forcibly bend the world to their will, or better yet, will a new world (1995: 92). 
Those inspired by Nietzsche’s unfashionable views often group these two forces together within the 
word ‘untimely’ – that which is not of the current time, but instead gestures to a ‘time to come’, a time 
that will indeed be engendered by select instances of untimeliness. It is also common to consider how 
this notion of the untimely is a forerunner for some of Nietzsche’s most significant motifs in his later 
work, such as the eternal return, the will to power, and the figure of the Overhuman.1 Deleuze is one 
such commentator.  
 
In his 1962 Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze takes up Nietzsche’s contrast between the truth-seekers, 
‘those who say: I’m looking for the truth’, and those beings that are of another type – ‘the inhuman and 
the superhuman’, which express ‘a type of forces unknown to man’ (Deleuze, 1983: 78-79). Of these two 
options, it is only the latter that are capable of affirming life. What’s more, in the act of affirming life the 
Overhuman provides meaning for the earth: ‘Affirmation is the highest power of the will. But what is 
affirmed? The earth, life…’ (Deleuze, 2005: 83). When this affirmation occurs the Overhuman is said to 
be ‘transhistoric’ (Deleuze, 1983: xiii) and ‘untimely’ (Deleuze, 2004: 126). Deleuze is here drawing on 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, where he exclaims: ‘The Overhuman is the sense of the earth. May your will say: 
Let the Overhuman be the sense of the earth!’ (Nietzsche, 2005: 12). And putting the same point 
differently: ‘Whoever one day teaches humans to fly will have shifted all boundary-stones; all boundary-
stones will themselves fly into the air before him, and the earth he will baptize anew – as “the Light One’’’ 
(Nietzsche, 2005: 167). 
 
It is telling that Deleuze’s first engagement with the call for a new earth occurs within the context of a 
discussion on method. Under the subheading ‘The Form of the Question in Nietzsche’, Deleuze brings 
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attention to Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism. Instead of the classical question ‘what is…?’, commonly posed 
by Plato/Socrates, Nietzsche asks ‘which one…?’ – a question which means: ‘what are the forces which 
take hold of a given thing, what is the will that possesses it?’ (Deleuze, 1983: 77). This alternative question, 
one should note, is not opposed to the inquiry into essence. On the contrary, it leads us to essence, by 
bringing to light its plurality and becoming. Essence, in other words, is not One, but multiple; it has an 
inherent perspectivity: ‘Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a plurality. Fundamentally 
it is always the question: ‘What is it for me’ (Deleuze, 1983: 77). The question of ‘which one’ is therefore 
superior to and metaphysically encompasses the question of ‘what is’, for it acknowledges the operation 
of force and will within the determination of essence: ‘Essence is always sense and value. And so the 
question “which one?” reverberates in and for all things: which forces, which will?’ (Deleuze, 1983: 77) 
 
As with essence, truth is not One but multiple. This does not necessarily mean that there are many truths, 
since it could rather be that there many perspectives on it. These different perspectives, however, are not 
all equivalent: there is a hierarchy of values, of higher and lower order – the Overhuman at the top, for 
instance, with the historians of ‘weakened personality’ lower down. Truth thus always has a relation to 
forces outside of itself, the forces that give it sense: 
 
We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, of the 
value of what we believe. Any thinkable or thought sense is only brought into effect insofar as 
the forces that correspond to it in thought also take hold of something, appropriate something, 
outside thought. Clearly thought cannot think by itself, any more than it can find truth by itself. 
The truth of a thought must be interpreted and evaluated according to the forces or power 
that determine it to think and to think this rather than that. (Deleuze, 1983: 104) 
 
As we can now see, the truth of the world and the meaning of the earth, as with life, is dependent on 
those who will it into being. Encapsulated into a figure, it is the Overhuman that affirms the earth and 
life; but what they more specifically affirm is its plurality and multiplicity, its becoming, in contrast to the 
nihilist who ‘considers becoming as something that must atone and must be reabsorbed into Being, and 
the multiple as something unjust that must be judged and reabsorbed into the One (Deleuze, 2005: 84).2 
 
Deleuze is here echoing an argument that he first makes in his study of Henri Bergson.3 As with 
Nietzsche, Bergson is highly critical of metaphysical frameworks that seek to ascertain the essence of 
things in general. According to the classical method inaugurated by Plato, the real is reconstructed through 
the use of general ideas. This ‘dialectical’ method, as Bergson calls it, begins by establishing certain facts 
as ‘general principles’, which it then attempts to apply to things and situations outside of those facts. To 
be more precise, a general concept, such as Being, is posited and then played off of its opposite, non-
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Being. This process of going from one opposite to another, however, is a ‘false movement’ that ‘tells us 
nothing’ (Deleuze, 1991: 44-45). If a concept is too broad or too general to tell us anything specific about 
reality, then playing it off its opposite hardly improves the situation. As Deleuze summarises: ‘The 
concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its 
opposite’ (Deleuze, 1991: 44). 
 
For example, consider the dichotomy of the One and the Many. Unlike those metaphysicians who 
attempt to articulate these two concepts at their maximal abstraction or generality, Bergson refuses to 
accept the legitimacy of the dualism from the outset, for there can be more than one kind of unity and 
more than one kind of multiple. The self, for instance, may be both one and multiple at the same time, 
but this does not mean that it is multiple in the same way as all other cases where that concept is used, 
nor can the self be adequately reduced to a primal form: ‘there is in it [our self] a multiplicity which, it 
must be recognized, has nothing in common with any other’ (Bergson, 2007: 148). From this Bergson 
concludes that ‘What really matters to philosophy is to know what unity, what multiplicity, what reality 
superior to the abstract one and the abstract multiple is the multiple unity of the person’ (Bergson, 2007: 
148). Thus we again have the question, ‘which one’. Or phrased another way: ‘why this rather than 
something else?’ (Deleuze, 2004: 24; see also 36). 
 
Bergson follows Nietzsche’s methodological lead in other ways. When faced with the question of ‘which 
one’, it is not simply a matter of choosing between pre-existent options. Indeed, part of the problem with 
most metaphysicians, in the view of Bergson, is that they are all too ready to work with the ‘ready-made’. 
But the sense or value of something does not come from nowhere. Like the times that we live in it must 
be created, an emergent construct from the ‘misty region of the ahistorical’ (Nietzsche, 1995: 91). Our 
task is therefore not one of mere selection amongst options already laid out for us: life, when well-lived, 
is not a case of ‘pick and mix’. Rather, its flavour must be generated, in the same way that discrete colours 
are carved out from a spectrum of plenitude. 
 
To explain this, Bergson uses the language of problems and solutions. Part of our problem, he suggests, 
is that the problems we obsess over are not of our own making, we have inherited them. What Bergson 
has in mind here has to do with the way in which problems are understood and framed: the component 
parts, relations between them, etc. In short, the sense or value of a problem. The sense or value of a 
problem cannot be ascertained ‘once and for all’. Aside from there being a plurality of senses/values, 
problems change over time, even if only because they have been around longer than before. For similar 
reasons, each one is singular, inasmuch as it cannot be fully subsumed within or reduced to a general Idea 
or category. As such, Bergson (2007: 23; see also 36-37) implores us to focus our energies not on the 
finding of a solution to inherited problems, but rather on articulating the precise sense of a problem. 
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When this happens, ‘the problems we considered insoluble will resolve themselves, or rather, be 
dissolved, either to disappear definitively, or to present themselves in some other way’. In shifting the 
emphasis from solutions to problems, it must be stressed that this does not mean Bergson is uninterested 
in solutions or considers them to be unimportant. Rather, as Deleuze (1991: 16) makes clear, ‘it is the 
solution that counts, but the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it 
is stated (i.e., the conditions under which it is determined as problem), and of the means and terms at 
our disposal for stating it’. 
 
As the language of this quotation makes evident, the Bergsonian method of problematisation shares a 
close affinity with Nietzsche’s genealogical method of critique (Deleuze, 1983: 1-2).4 For Deleuze, 
Bergson and Nietzsche, it is this ‘differential element’ that drives their thinking. It is also what determines 
the meaning and direction of reality – of life and the earth, as conceived by those who create it. Bergson 
will call this element the élan vital, and Nietzsche the will to power. Deleuze has other names that extend 
the call for a new earth and people. 
 
 
Mapping the Geography of the Call 
 
There are three interrelated registers, roughly speaking, in which Deleuze and Guattari cash out this call 
for a new earth, a new people: (1) the socio-political; (2) the arts; and (3) philosophical thought. Common 
to all instances is an overriding concern for the geography of creation. 
 
The earth is spoken about repeatedly in Deleuze and Guattari’s first book Anti-Oedipus. This is because 
it is the counterpart to their concept of ‘territory’ – a notion that, along with affiliated terms such as 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, dominates their work. A territory is a socially structured space 
that is overlaid upon the earth, the latter of which has no intrinsic subdivisions. Territories are constructed 
in various ways and also undergo processes of transformation; elements perennially flee a territory, 
escaping on a line of flight that can bring about the deterritorialisation of a territory and a simultaneous 
reterritorialisation onto something else. That ‘something else’ could be another territory, in which case 
the deterritorialisation experienced is said to be ‘relative’, since it is relative to the earth. But a line of 
flight could also reterritorialise on deterritorialisation itself, in which case the deterritorialisation 
experienced is said to be ‘absolute’. In such instances it is the earth itself that is made relative to the 
absolute movement, producing as a result a new earth, and with it a people appropriate to that earth, a new 
people. 
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If the Overhuman is the figure for Nietzsche that distils the call for a new earth and people, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s first substitute figure is that of the schizo. The ground for this figure is prepared by their 
discussion of three ‘great social machines’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 141). The first social machine 
outlined is what they call the primitive territorial machine. This machine creates meaning by coding the 
earth and marking bodies (1984: 142). Upon this form a second is founded, which instead of coding the 
earth operates by overcoding existing codes. Through this process of reinscription, all codes are diverted to 
a single despot, whose sign then becomes the source and meaning for all codes. Unlike the primitive 
territorial machine, which was based on ‘the immanent unity of the earth as the immobile motor’, the 
despotic machine provides ‘a transcendent unity of an altogether different nature – the unity of the State 
[…] which now takes charge of the fertility of the soil as well as the rain from the sky and the general 
appropriation of the productive forces’ (1984: 146).  
 
Whereas the primitive territorial machine operates by coding the earth and the imperial despotic machine 
overcodes all codes, a third great social machine – the civilised capitalist machine – functions by decoding 
all codings and overcodings it comes across. The capitalist machine has no real interest in what a coding 
or overcoding happens to be – the intrinsic essence of a coding/overcoding is irrelevant. For this reason 
the ideology of capitalism is said to be ‘a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed’ (1984: 
34, 267). What matters, within the capitalist machine, is the differential value between codings/overcodings, for 
the greater this difference then the greater the profit. Such processes of capitalisation can only be 
conducted if all codings/overcodings are rendered onto the same unitary market. Hence why capitalism 
is defined (in part) by its activity of decoding and promotion of a global market for the exchange of all 
codings/overcodings. 
 
In one sense, the capitalist machine unifies the earth by exerting a massive force of deterritorialisation 
whilst inaugurating a market that encompasses the entire globe. Deleuze and Guattari (1989: 454) are 
careful to stress, however, that this does not mean a new earth is created by capitalism: ‘its power of 
deterritorialisation consists in taking as its object, not the earth, but “materialised labour”, the 
commodity’. Capitalism may universalise the earth and its history, converting all things and meanings 
into commodities, but this is no act of escape; on the contrary, nothing is allowed to escape its powers 
of decoding and reappropriation (more specifically, ‘axiomatisation’). Nothing is allowed to die, as capital 
is capable of animating and reanimating everything, since anything can be exchanged on the global market 
– all existing societies are brought within its fold, as are all previous societies: ‘capitalism has haunted all 
forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying nightmare’ (1984: 140). As such, capitalism 
consumes the earth and serves as the limit of all societies, but it is more precisely their relative limit (1984: 
245-246). By inserting itself into all of the earth’s relations, and continually pushing the limits of the earth 
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itself, capitalism takes over the world, but it does not create one. For that more revolutionary act of 
creation, schizophrenia is required. 
 
While capitalism is the relative limit of all societies, schizophrenia is ‘the absolute limit that causes the 
flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without organs’ (1984: 246). The attraction of 
schizophrenia for Deleuze and Guattari is quite straightforward: the schizo has an outstanding ability to 
change who they are. Put differently, ‘The schizo knows how to leave: he has made departure into 
something as simple as being born or dying’ (1984: 131). While seductive to some readers, it should be 
noted that the term is also the source for a great deal of criticism levelled at them, given that schizophrenia 
is a medical condition seen by many to be far from attractive. In their defence, Deleuze and Guattari 
clarify that the term is used in an exceptional and conceptual sense. Deleuze will also elaborate in a later 
interview that the sole purpose of Anti-Oedipus was to prevent people from being reduced to a pulp and 
developing the early stages of schizophrenia as a medical condition – an outcome that leads to their 
hospitalisation (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: ‘D for Desire’). Their work must therefore not be taken too 
literally. It must also be taken in a measured and balanced way, in which one harnesses the destructive 
and productive powers of schizophrenia but with ‘extreme prudence’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 138), 
as well as ‘great patience, great care’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 318).5 Schizophrenia, as Deleuze and 
Guattari (1983: 318) see it, destroys the ‘representative territorialities and reterritorializations through 
which a subject passes’. There are of course attempts to interrupt such destruction, but when uninhibited, 
the schizophrenic process of deterritorialisation leads to the creation of a new earth. In this respect, 
schizos ‘are like Zarathustra’ (1983: 131). 
 
The liberatory sentiment that Deleuze and Guattari invest in the schizo is fairly obvious. We should be 
mindful, though, of the particular context in which such statements are advanced. That context is the 
critique of psychoanalytic theories and practices that were dominant in the period Anti-Oedipus was 
written. Deleuze and Guattari’s choice of the schizo as a Zarathustra-like figure can only be 
comprehended when one notes what it is up against and contrasted to: the conditions of paranoia, 
neurosis, and psychosis. It is in aid of escaping these ends that Deleuze and Guattari champion the schizo 
and their ability to create a new land, a new earth. The psychoanalytic context is not exactly necessary, 
however, for making the point, and there are other figures that do the same job, such as the nomad: she 
who constructs a war-machine directed against the State and other apparatuses of capture. As with the 
schizo, the nomad is ‘the Deterritorialised par excellence’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 381), because 
their traveling is not for the sake of relocating from one territory to another (as is the case with migrants). 
Rather, their movement is itself a way of life, which is to say that with the nomad ‘it is deterritorialization 
that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on 
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deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 381; 
Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 134). 
 
Although the psychoanalytic context loses much of its importance after the publication of Anti-Oedipus, 
the call for a new earth and people remains pivotal. It is more frequently explored, however, in a different 
register: artistic creation. In between the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze published 
a book with Claire Parnet which previewed many of the developments that were to come. In a chapter 
on literature Deleuze and Parnet provocatively suggest that Anglo-American literature is superior to that 
of the French. As they put it: 
 
Thomas Hardy, Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe, Lawrence, Fitzgerald, 
Miller, Kerouac. In them everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, 
relationship with the outside. They create a new Earth: but perhaps the movement of the earth 
is deterritorialization itself. American literature operates according to geographical lines: the 
flight towards the West, the discovery that the true East is in the West, the sense of the 
frontiers as something to cross, to push back, to go beyond. The becoming is geographical. 
There is no equivalent in France. The French are too human, too historical, too concerned 
with the future and the past. They spend their time in in-depth analysis. They do not know 
how to become […]. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 37) 
 
He may not be mentioned, but the connection from this passage back to Nietzsche is not hard to spot. 
As with the historians weighed down by their tomes of knowledge, unable to breath clean air due to the 
haze of history that surrounds them, French literature, Deleuze and Parnet suggest, is burdened by the 
past and the demands of analysis. The Anglo-American tradition, by contrast, is of another nature: it is 
geographical instead of historical, preoccupied with becoming instead of Being, ahistorical and 
suprahistorical – which is to say untimely – insofar as it is against the status quo and for the creation of 
a new dimension: ‘The author creates a world, but there is no world which awaits us to be created’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 52). 
 
While such generalisations of literary traditions can be somewhat jarring and perhaps unnecessary, the 
point they are making about creative forms of writing is a worthy one. It is a point that can also be 
extended to fine art more broadly. Indeed, it is especially through the visual arts that, in A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari extend their call for a new earth and people. As with their description of 
the three great social machines in Anti-Oedipus, this discussion moves from ‘the forces of the earth’ and 
its territorialisation towards lines of deterritorialisation that leave the earth – the cosmic breakaway (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1989: 337). There is no need to rehearse the three stages in detail, for it is the direction of 
travel that we are more concerned with, along with the concluding stage reached.6 The forces of chaos 
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and the forces of the earth may be immense, but what Deleuze and Guattari wish to articulate are those 
instances in which such forces are overcome to create a new plane of existence. This is done by harnessing 
forces of an unworldly nature: ‘The forces to be captured are no longer those of the earth, which still 
constitute a great expressive Form, but the forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and energetic Cosmos’ 
(1989: 342-343). The word ‘immaterial’ must be read here with caution, for what Deleuze and Guattari 
are getting at is also characterised in the same paragraph as ‘a molecularized matter’, in contrast to matter 
that is ‘molar’. The word ‘nonvisible’ is also employed: the forces of the cosmos are nonvisible, in their 
molecular state, and the task of those who attempt to harness them is to render visible such forces into 
states of consistency. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari stress that such rendering of cosmic forces is not an act of reproduction; it is not 
a matter of representation, but presentation – a making present of the cosmic forces that insist in things. 
Cézanne is offered as an example in the visual arts, and Debussy in music, but their central example is 
provided by Paul Klee (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 343). As Klee explains in On Modern Art, his work is 
concerned with locating a point of consistency, a ‘gray point’, from within the forces of chaos. This point 
then ‘jumps over itself’ and ‘tries convulsively to fly from the earth […] powered by centrifugal forces 
that triumph over gravity’ (Klee, 1966: 43).7 The allusions here to Nietzsche are again especially strong. 
Aside from the reference to gravity (the Overhuman as ‘the Light One’ or ‘weightless’), it could be noted 
that the eternal return is also described as a centrifugal force that expels lesser values so that only the 
highest ‘return’ (see Deleuze, 1994: 55, 90 and 297). Moreover, the eternal return, for Deleuze (1994: 90), 
is a problem that must be posed. 
 
And so we return to the ‘problematic’ nature of the call. As it happens, the notion of the problem features 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s final text, What Is Philosophy? (1994). Commentators have frequently remarked 
that Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as the creation of concepts, but while this short definition 
is correct, it is only partially correct. While philosophy does indeed involve the creation of concepts for 
Deleuze and Guattari, it also involves (amongst other things) the construction of problems that determine the 
sense of concepts and their relations within a horizon: ‘All concepts are connected to problems without which 
they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution 
emerges’ (1994: 16). This is not to say that concepts are straightforwardly reducible to a problematic 
context, for concepts can zigzag between problems, connect different problems together and assign 
conditions to a problem (1994: 18, 21). We are unable to elaborate on the intricacies of their relations at 
present (see Lundy 2012: 146-162), but it will suffice to say that the relation of concept and problem 
draws much from the Bergsonian problematology already outlined above: 
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A solution has no meaning independently of a problem to be determined in its conditions and 
unknowns; but these conditions and unknowns have no meaning independently of solutions 
determinable as concepts. Each of the three instances is found in the others, but they are not 
of the same kind, and they coexist and subsist without one disappearing into the other. 
Bergson, who contributed so much to the comprehension of the nature of philosophical 
problems, said that a well-posed problem was a problem solved. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 
81; see also 27) 
 
Thinking, though, is not purely incorporeal. It always occurs somewhere, at a particular time and place; 
it has a ‘milieu’, a relationship with the earth (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 69). Or rather, ‘thinking takes 
place in the relationship of territory and earth’ (1994: 85).8 As with the socio-political and artistic contexts 
canvassed above, there are instances where thought is rendered relative to the existing forces of the earth 
and ‘the territories that take shape and pass away on it’, but when pushed to its limits, or rather beyond 
them, thinking constructs a new plane for thought that adsorbs the earth. In other words, the earth is itself 
made relative to an absolute thought, a ‘Being-thought’ or ‘Nature-thought’, that leads to ‘the creation of 
a future new earth’ (1994: 88). 
 
Problems, therefore, are what situate thought; and problems are themselves situated by the time and 
place in which they occur. But problems are not eternal, and they must themselves be constructed. When 
they are fully ‘worked out’ they dissolve, bringing about a new state of affairs with new problematic 
constellations. This point is perhaps best put by the Bergsonian disciple Charles Péguy, who says the 
following when describing the experience of problematic transformation: 
 
Suddenly, we felt that we were no longer the same convicts. Nothing had happened. Yet a problem 
in which a whole world collided, a problem without issue, in which no end could be seen, suddenly 
ceased to exist and we asked ourselves what we had been talking about. Instead of an ordinary 
solution, a found solution, this problem, this difficulty, this impossibility had just passed what 
seemed like a physical point of resolution. A crisis point. At the same time, the whole world had 
passed what seemed like a physical crisis point. There are critical points of the event just as there 
are critical points of temperature: points of fusion, freezing and boiling points; points of coagulation 
and crystallization. There are even in the case of events states of superfusion which are precipitated, 
crystallized or determined only by the introduction of a fragment of some future event. […] 
[N]othing happened, and we are in a new people, in a new world, in a new humanity. (Péguy, 1931: 
269)9 
 
In this passage we have it all: the distillation of a world in a problem; the dissolution (rather than solution) 
of both; a fragment of the future, or untimely thought, that serves as a spur to bring forth a new world 
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and people. The task of great thinkers, as with artists, is to take us farther in the construction and 
dissolution of problems, to find ways of grasping or rendering forces beyond this world and humanity to 
precipitate a new world and people. But how, one might rightly ask, is this to actually occur? 
 
 
Sounding the Call 
 
Before turning to this question, let’s take a closer look at the character traits of who it is that does the 
calling and who it is that is called. Starting with the latter, the first thing we can say about the people being 
called is that they are missing, they do not exist – or at least not yet, they are a people to come, they are what 
we lack and what we seek. In light of this, giving a precise description of their actual features in advance 
is impossible, and rightly so: ‘The people are missing means that the fundamental affinity between a work 
of art and a people that does not yet exist is not, will never be clear’ (Deleuze, 2006: 324). In saying they 
are ‘still-missing’, however, we must avoid at all costs the impression that the people already exist in 
ideality; there is no pre-existing or eternal Idea or ideal of a particular possible people that one then 
attempts to realise. 
 
Rather than a possible people, we should say with Deleuze that those who are ‘still missing’ are virtual. 
While the possible is the opposite of the real and thus has no reality, the virtual is opposed to the actual 
and both are real, though in different ways. The possible/real relation is subject to the principles of 
resemblance and limitation: the possible and the real resemble one another, in the same way that the shape 
of the cookie cutter resembles that of the cookie; and the selection process involves a limiting in which 
one option amongst many is chosen whilst the others are eliminated. By contrast, actualisation is a process 
of differentiation, in which a virtual totality diverges along various emerging lines. As such, the movement 
from the virtual to the actual adheres to a principle of difference, as opposed to the resemblance of 
identities. Furthermore, it is in the act of differentiation that actualities are first created. This means that 
the second principle of this alternative formulation is creation as opposed to elimination: ‘the characteristic 
of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to 
differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualized’ (Deleuze, 1991: 97). 
 
In other words, the people who are missing, who are yet to come, are not and cannot be known in 
advance, even by those who bring them forth, for they are not a possible people. Rather, and most 
importantly, they must be created. In the context of art, where does an original piece of work reside before it 
is created? Nowhere. It is created in the act of creation – line by line, paint stroke by paint stroke; and in 
most cases the created can only be retrospectively identified as such, including the possibility that such a 
thing could be created. When an artist creates an earth-shattering work, they often do not even ‘know’ 
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what it is they are doing (or how), let alone know in advance the precise features of the work as a 
‘possibility’. To borrow another example from Bergson, where did Hamlet reside before Shakespeare 
wrote it (Bergson, 2007: 83)? The suggestion that Hamlet existed in the ether as a fully-formed possibility 
before it was created is absurd. So too with the people to come. 
 
Which is why, pace contemporary populists, creating a people has nothing to do with fostering or 
reinstituting a mythical Volk. Nietzsche’s sister unfortunately misunderstood this, contributing to the 
Nazi appropriation of his work. But so too did Heidegger. Touching on his fascists predilections, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1994: 108-109) say that Heidegger ‘wanted to rejoin the Greeks through the Germans, at 
the worst moment in their history: is there anything worse, said Nietzsche, than to find oneself facing a 
German when one was expecting a Greek’? Heidegger, they continue, ‘got the wrong people, earth, and 
blood. For the race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather 
an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race – the very ones that Kant 
excluded from the paths of the new Critique’ (1994: 109).10 So we can now say that the people to come, 
whoever they are, are minoritarian. Which is not to say that they are a minority. It is not an issue of identity 
politics, but the processes of becoming-minor that cross-cut all of us. Similarly, it is not a problem of or 
for the demos, but quite the opposite – it is in the nomos, beyond the city walls, that the people we are 
missing, the imperceptible people, reside. The people to come cannot be found in our democracies for 
the simple reason that ‘Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always 
eludes the majority’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 108). And it is in this sense that those who succeed in 
making the call are aristocratic. Not because they are aristocrats in the majoritarian or identitarian sense of 
this word, but because unlike populist thinkers and artists they are not of this time – their work can never 
be described on the dust jacket as a ‘timely contribution’ to some pre-existing movement or problematic. 
Resistance to the present is therefore the leading trait of those who call for a people to come, but this present 
includes the utopian visions of a possible future that circumscribe the present. Those who sound the call 
for a future people and earth, in short, are those who are able to grasp hold of a minoritarian or nomadic 
tendency and give it voice – an act that shatters an existing façade by providing a glimpse of an Other 
world and way of being that is entirely unrecognisable and out of kilter with the present. 
 
The importance of this minoritarian element cannot be under-emphasised. In their book on Franz Kafka, 
Deleuze and Guattarti set out the characteristics of what they refer to as ‘minor literature’. The first is 
that ‘language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 17). 
In Kafka’s case the coordinates of deterritorialisation have to do with the strangeness of writing in 
German as a Prague Jew, but a more contemporary example would be the unravellings and perversions 
of the English language that occur as it is ‘bastardised’ by minoritarian communities. As this suggests, 
minor literature is inherently political (its second characteristic), but it also takes on a collective value (its 
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third characteristic). Insofar as it offers a glimpse of the faceless, minor literature ‘finds itself positively 
charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation’ (1986: 17). Thus 
when Kafka says that literature is a concern of the people (Kafka, 1948: 193), the people he has in mind 
are a ‘virtual community’ expressed by a minor writer who aims ‘to forge the means for another 
consciousness and another sensibility’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 17, 84, emphasis added). 
 
In Deleuze’s (1989: 215-216) second book on cinema he nominates several auteurs who also show us 
glimpses of this kind – ‘modern’ film-makers, such as Resnais and the Straubs, who ‘know how to show 
how the people are what is missing, are not there’. In contrast to classical cinema, which views the 
medium of cinema as ‘art of the masses’ and hence ‘democratic art’ (1989: 216), modern cinema proceeds 
according to a different politics – a micropolitics of the molecular and minor. Much credit is also given 
to ‘third world film-makers’ for ‘contributing to the invention of a people’, to the extent that they shine 
a light on who is absent from the majoritarian schema (1989: 217). Such directors produce utterances 
from the outside, speech-acts that give voice to a collective Other, ‘which are like the seeds of a people 
to come, and whose political impact is immediate and inescapable’ (Deleuze, 1989: 221). When this 
happens, cinema becomes what Jean Rouch calls cinema-vérité, truth-cinema (Deleuze, 1989: 151). The 
point here is not to ‘show the truth’, as if it had been out there all-the-while, obscured by majoritarian 
forces before being revealed. Rather, there is a truth to this kind of cinema because it makes the true. In 
doing so it follows Nietzsche by destroying the model of the true worshipped by those ‘servants of truth’ 
with ‘weakened personality’; or if one prefers, it is Bergsonian insofar as it shuns pre-fabricated truths 
that are ‘ready-made’. At its best, cinema-vérité boils down to story-telling or myth-making, fabulation, and 
in several directions at once: the characters who become other and merge with the missing people, the 
people coming about; the film-maker who ‘takes real characters as intercessors and replaces his fictions 
by their own story-telling’ (Deleuze, 1989: 152).11 We could say, in the spirit of Nietzsche, that these 
double becomings take us ‘Beyond the true and the false’ to ‘becoming as power of the false’ (Deleuze, 
1989: 275). But alternatively, following Bergson, we could insist that the determination of true/false be 
conducted at the level of problems – the truth and falsity of a problematic construction, instead of true 
or false solutions to an inherited problem. When the tune is played in this key, ‘True freedom lies in a 
power to decide, to constitute problems themselves. And this “semi-divine” power entails the 
disappearance of false problems as much as the creative upsurge of true ones’ (Deleuze, 1991: 15). 
 
How, then, does one sound the call? By now it should be clear that there is no easy answer to this question. 
If the call came with an assembly guide then it wouldn’t even work the one time, let alone repeatedly. 
There are, however, some things that we can say on this topic. Firstly, don’t criticise: ‘those who criticize 
without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the 
forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28). Secondly, 
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to modify a common saying, ‘do as I do, but in a different way that bears no resemblance’. If the past 
provides us with inspiration, it is insofar as we use it to create something new, to ‘do as they did’ by 
bringing forth a new people and earth, not the same one that was previously conjured.12 Thirdly, do not 
seek the truth, if by that you imagine that the truth is ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; instead, seek 
that which is interesting, remarkable or important, since these categories – which ‘cannot be known 
before being constructed’ – are what ‘determine success or failure’ (1994: 82). As Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994: 27-28) say of concepts, if one attempt to bring forth a new earth and people is better than another, 
‘it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen 
cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys us’. Fourthly, don’t go crazy, or try to pretend as if you 
are; deterritorialisation is a difficult thing to fake. If one wishes to mess with the status quo, to efface it, 
then a haphazard scrambling of lines will not suffice. A young child’s messy scribbling, or that of an 
elephant, is not really art. In the same vein, jazz improvisation, when done well in a way that opens up 
new worlds, is extremely difficult, for it is not merely a matter of mashing random notes together. To 
open onto the cosmic and render a portion of it visible, ‘a certain simplicity’ is required, ‘a maximum of 
calculated sobriety’ – ‘the sobriety of a becoming-child’, which is not the same as ‘the becoming of the 
child’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 344). 
 
For those seeking more specific instructions on what to do, or even just a concrete articulation of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ‘position’, this list will no doubt seem inadequate if not laughable. Much turns, however, 
on the extent to which one detects (or wishes to extract) a ‘normative’ agenda in their work.13 It also 
depends on the agendas that one brings to Deleuze and Guattari’s work in the first place. Jeremy Gilbert 
puts this point well when he says: ‘the analytical resources offered by Deleuze’s work […] might be 
deployed from a range of political perspectives not necessarily limited to those which would seem to 
receive some explicit endorsement within it’ (Gilbert, 2009: 11). Gilbert is here reflecting on two 
influential critics of Deleuze, Phillipe Mengue and Peter Hallward, who were both disappointed in their 
own ways with ‘Deleuze’s politics’ – in the case of Mengue its ‘anti-democratic’ tenor, and in the case of 
Hallward its general withdrawal from the socio-political arena.14 But as Gilbert’s survey essay goes on to 
show, Deleuze has been attacked and defended from all manner of political perspectives.15 One could 
even say that this is one of its distinctive features, for better or worse; something Deleuze indeed shares 
with Bergson, who was pilloried ‘not only [by] his natural enemies, but the enemies of his enemies’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 133). Does this feature itself indicate a particular political persuasion? Maybe. But 
in any case, it is important to remember that the socio-political is only one of three registers of the call 
for a new earth and new people, and it is not at all clear that it should be given precedence. And this is 
perhaps the value in engaging with the call across multiple registers, as an untimely problem, rather than 
approaching it from within the confines of a particular discipline and/or established set of debates – for 
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if the call is continually comprehended and positioned with respect to the ready-made landscape, we 
should not be surprised when it comes to look like the earth and the people that we already have. 
 
For the last word on this matter it is perhaps most appropriate to go back to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
engagement with Klee, as it includes the closest thing to a ‘how-to’ manual that we are likely to get. ‘[T]he 
artist begins by looking around him- or herself, into all the milieus, but does so in order to grasp the trace 
of creation in the created, of naturing nature in natured nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 337). Before 
us sits something created, being, but there was a time when it was in the process of becoming. Our first 
task is to detect the trace of that dynamic element, amongst what presently exists, if only to use it as a 
reminder that creation is achievable, it can be done. Associated with this is a second reminder: things 
were not always this way, and they could have been different. They still could be. Inspired by these 
reminders, the artist or thinker for the future must then turn ‘his or her attention to the microscopic, to 
crystals, molecules, atoms, and particles, not for scientific conformity, but for movement, for nothing 
but immanent movement’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 337). The suggestion here is not to become 
obsessed with minutia and lose sight of the ‘bigger picture’ – after all, these particles are nothing if not 
cosmic. It is at the molecular level that temporary territories (this patch of land, that body) reincorporate 
into an immanent universe – as poetic cosmologists like to say, we are all made of stardust. Once open 
to this Cosmos, and its unfolding lines of differentiation, the last task is ‘to harness forces in a “work”’ 
(1989: 337) – to latch on to a passing comet, like the cat on the back of the witch’s broom, and make 
something worthy of it.16 Where it takes us and what comes of it we naturally can’t say in advance, but 
one can do as best one can to problematise reality and act ‘counter to the past, and therefore on the present, 
for the benefit, let us hope, of a future’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 112). 
 
 
Endnotes 
1 For more on this see Lundy, 2009: 197-198. 
2 For more on Deleuze’s call for a people to come in relation to Nietzsche see Mengue, 2008: 221-222.  Somewhat 
curiously, Mengue does not mention the untimely, nor does he discuss truth, sense and value. 
3 Although Deleuze’s book on Bergson is published four years after his book on Nietzsche, it should be noted that 
his engagement with Bergson happened first. For more on this see Lundy, 2018: 9. 
4 In addition to the Bergson-Nietzsche nexus, it could be noted that Deleuze also draws on Marx for this point. 
See Deleuze, 1991: 16, and Deleuze, 1994: 186. 
5 For more on this see Lundy 2013. 
6 For those interested in the detail of the three ‘ages’ see Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 338-347. 
7 For further discussion of the artistic register of the call for a new earth and people see: Grosz 2008, Brito 2009, 
and O’Sullivan 2006 and 2016. 
8 See also Deleuze, 2006: 383. For a more detailed examination of the ‘where’ of philosophical thought see Lundy 
2011. 
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9 For more on Deleuze’s engagement with Péguy see Lundy 2019. 
10 For an extensive examination of the relation between Deleuze and Heidegger on the ‘invention of a people’ see 
Sholtz 2015. 
11 Deleuze adopts this notion of ‘fabulation’ from Bergson (Deleuze, 1995: 125-126). For more on this issue in 
relation to the people to come see Bogue 2006, and more expansively, Bogue 2010. 
12 Nietzsche, it could be noted, pairs Zarathustra with a buffoon as a double – someone who will ape him, and in 
so doing be nothing like him (Nietzsche, 2005: 152-154). See also the chapter on ‘The Convalescent’ (Nietzsche, 
2005: 188-193). 
13 For an interesting discussion of the ‘normativity of Deleuze and Guattari’s work see Alliez et al, 2009: 147-169. 
14 The best response to Mengue’s ‘anti-democratic’ accusation (a criticism also voiced by Rancière, 2010: 169-183) 
is given by Paul Patton (2010: 137-210). As for Hallward’s interpretation of Deleuze, dissenters amongst the 
Deleuze community are numerous. For my own remarks on it see Lundy, 2012: 188. 
15 In the decade since Gilbert’s article this has only further proliferated, illustrated by publications such as Deleuze 
and Anarchism (Gray van Heerden and Eloff, 2019) and Nicholas Tampio’s Deleuze’s Political Vision (2015), which 
positions Deleuze as a liberal in the vein of John Stuart Mill. See also Lundy 2013 and 2017. 
16 For more on ‘the witch’s broom’ (also referred to as the ‘witch’s line’) see: Deleuze, 1998: 3-5 and 109; Deleuze 
and Parnet, 2002: 15 and 76; Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 248; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 41 and 185; Deleuze, 
1995: 104. 
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